In six days of November, three announcements described the same market from three angles. On 13 November, Richemont reported that its jewellery business, led by Cartier and Van Cleef & Arpels, grew 19% at constant exchange rates in the six months to September. On 17 November, reports citing Bernstein said Gucci's Padlock bag now costs 2,450 euros in France, against 3,500 euros in July, and Kering's new group director of pricing, a former Nike planning executive, announced his appointment. On 18 November, Bain forecast that jewellery would be luxury's strongest category in 2026, up 8 to 10%, while shoes would fall 3 to 5%, and that buyers of personal luxury goods would shrink from 330 million to about 315 million. The easy headline is that jewellery is winning and fashion is losing. It is accurate, and it explains very little. The more useful question is why customers keep paying more for one and walk away from the other, when both raised their prices.
PART I: WHAT THE MARKET IS SHOWING
The category split. Bain's Luxury Worldwide Market Study, presented in Milan on 18 November, puts total luxury spending at about 1.5 trillion euros in 2026, between flat and up 2% at constant exchange rates. Personal luxury goods are expected at 367 billion euros, up 1 to 3% at current rates. Inside that number the gap is wide: jewellery up 8 to 10%, eyewear 4 to 6%, watches 3 to 5%, beauty 2 to 4%, apparel 1 to 3%, leather goods close to flat at 0 to 2% "amid intense competition", and shoes down 3 to 5% "as price increases and competition from adjacent categories weigh on demand". Bain calls jewellery "the strongest-performing category", supported by "self-purchase, everyday wear and renewed creativity across price points". More than 70% of hard luxury players are growing, while roughly 60% of soft luxury brands are flat or declining.
The same split inside the groups. At LVMH, watches and jewellery grew 6% organically in the third quarter, while fashion and leather goods, the group's largest division, fell 5%. At Kering, Kering Jewelry grew 11% on a comparable basis to 239 million euros in the quarter, while Gucci fell 6% to 1,291 million euros. At Richemont, jewellery sales reached 9.15 billion euros in the half year, up 19% at constant exchange rates. In each group, jewellery is the division growing fastest, in the same quarter, facing the same customers.
The customers. Bain estimates that buyers of personal luxury goods will fall from 330 million in 2025 to about 315 million in 2026, as consumers redirect spending "toward premium leisure and entertainment". Its earlier studies had already counted about 50 million buyers lost in the two years to 2024. The total luxury consumer base, which includes experiences, is stable at around 450 million. Top customers account for more than half of all luxury spending and about 48% of personal luxury goods, and Bain says they "more than offset" the decline in aspirational buyers. In the Americas, around three quarters of first-half growth was price-driven.
The fashion response. According to reports citing Bernstein analyst Luca Solca, Gucci's Padlock top-handle bag fell from 3,500 euros in July to 2,450 euros in France, about 30% lower; the Mercato tote is reported 20 to 25% cheaper, and some sneakers moved from 800 euros to between 560 and 595 euros. These are reported as new regular prices, not markdowns. Kering's third-quarter presentation spoke of "targeted adjustments to improve perceived value, led by Handbags". On 17 November, Francisco Ochando announced on LinkedIn that he had joined Kering as group director of pricing, after more than eleven years in planning at Nike, most recently in lifestyle footwear. Louis Vuitton is reported to be reluctant to cut prices on existing products, and LVMH has not confirmed any cuts.
The evidence against the obvious story. Four sets of data complicate it.
First, jewellery is slowing. Richemont's jewellery growth eased to 14% in the second quarter, short of what analysts expected, the group's overall growth fell from 20% to 13% between the first and second quarters, and the shares fell sharply on the day. LVMH's watches and jewellery slowed from 11% in the second quarter to 6% in the third.
Second, part of the jewellery win is price. The World Gold Council reports that global gold jewellery demand fell 17% in the third quarter to 313 tonnes, "the weakest third quarter in our data series", while its value rose 2% to 43 billion dollars. The LBMA gold price averaged 4,262 dollars an ounce in the quarter, 23% higher than a year earlier. Richemont said higher production costs, "notably gold", were mostly offset "by price increases over the past year and a more favourable sales mix". Customers are buying fewer grams of gold for more money.
Third, not all jewellery wins. Pandora, the largest jeweller in the accessible segment, grew 6% organically in the third quarter and expects 2 to 3% for the year, well below Bain's range for the category. And the diamond, long the store of value at the centre of jewellery, has lost that role in its synthetic form: De Beers reports that wholesale prices of lab-grown diamonds have fallen 93% since 2020.
Fourth, not all leather goods lose. Hermès grew its leather goods and saddlery 10.8% at constant exchange rates in the third quarter, to 1.91 billion euros, in the same quarter that LVMH's fashion and leather goods fell 5%. Geography cuts across every category too: Richemont's sales in the Middle East and Africa fell 7% in the second quarter, and Bain expects personal luxury goods in the Middle East, Africa and Oceania to fall 10 to 14% this year.
PART II: WHAT THE MARKET IS NOT SAYING
Both categories raised prices. Only one kept its customers. This is the fact the jewellery-versus-fashion headline hides. Richemont offset gold costs with price increases and grew 19%. Gold jewellery buyers worldwide faced a gold price 23% higher, bought 17% less metal, and still spent 2% more. Over the same period, Bain names price increases as a reason shoes are falling, and Kering is cutting some Gucci prices by up to 30% to "improve perceived value". Price alone cannot be the variable: the same move produced opposite reactions.
The first difference is whether the customer can explain the price. When a gold bracelet costs more after gold has risen by almost a quarter in a year, the increase has an external reason that anyone can read in the news, and part of what the customer pays for is metal with a market value of its own. When fashion prices rose year after year after 2019, neither the materials nor the object visibly changed; the increase could be justified only by the brand itself. Kering's own phrase, "perceived value", is an admission of exactly this gap, and Bain describes a "value proposition gap in the middle of the pyramid". We want to be precise about the status of this claim: we have no survey showing that buyers think about the gold price when they buy a bracelet. It is an interpretation that fits the data better than "customers simply prefer jewellery".
The second difference is how long the object lasts. Bain's own explanation for jewellery, "self-purchase" and "everyday wear", describes use over years, not seasons. Read Bain's category ranking with that in mind and it roughly follows the life of the object: jewellery, worn every day for decades, at the top; shoes, which wear out and date fastest, at the bottom. Hermès is the counter-example that confirms the pattern: its leather goods grow because a Birkin or a Kelly is bought as a permanent object, not a seasonal one. The secondhand market is the economy's own measure of this. Bain estimates it grew 7 to 8% a year between 2019 and 2025, three to four times faster than new luxury. Customers are increasingly pricing not only what an object costs, but what it will still be worth.
The divide runs through categories, not between them. Seen this way, the split is not jewellery against fashion. It is between objects whose value survives the purchase and objects whose value ends at the till. A Hermès bag sits on the same side as a Cartier bracelet. A trend bag sits on the same side as a seasonal sneaker. And a lab-grown diamond, whose wholesale price has collapsed, sits on the wrong side even though it is jewellery.
A framework: the half-life test. For an executive, three questions now matter more than the category a product belongs to:
- Legibility: can the customer explain the price to someone else? Metal content, hours of craftsmanship, scarcity that is real rather than announced.
- Permanence: will the object still be worn or used in five years, or does it belong to a season?
- Floor: what is it worth once it leaves the store, and who controls that value, the house or the secondhand market?
Products that score well on all three are where luxury is still growing. Products that score badly on all three are where prices are now being cut.
PART III: WHAT COMES NEXT
The gold test. The most useful signal of the next twelve months is one the industry does not control. Gold peaked above 5,000 dollars an ounce in January and was trading below 4,000 dollars in early November. If gold keeps falling while jewellery houses keep their prices where they are, the external reason for their increases fades. If jewellery growth holds anyway, the explanation is permanence and desire, not metal. If it weakens sharply, part of the 2026 jewellery boom was a gold boom. Either result will tell executives something this year's numbers cannot.
The fashion repricing. Fashion now has two routes. Gucci is taking the first: lowering prices to rebuild "perceived value", with a pricing director hired from a sportswear company, in the year Bain names shoes as luxury's weakest category. The second route is to make fashion more legible and more permanent without cutting prices: permanent collections instead of seasonal ones, visible craftsmanship, repair and certified resale run by the house itself. Louis Vuitton's reported reluctance to cut prices on existing products suggests it intends to defend the second route. The next few quarters at Gucci will show whether lower prices bring back traffic, or whether the problem was desirability rather than price.
The risk inside jewellery's success. Durable objects have a weakness that watches have already revealed: they compete with their own past production. Bain expects watches to grow only 3 to 5% this year, and Swiss watch exports are up 3.4% in the first ten months. WatchCharts reports that Rolex, which makes up more than half of its index, has been carrying record levels of secondary supply; its secondary prices fell 1.1% in October, while Patek Philippe's are up 15.6% over the year. Today's jewellery sales are tomorrow's secondhand stock. Houses that build their own resale and certification, and so control the floor, will keep the value they created. Houses that do not will meet their own bracelets on resale platforms, at a discount.
Who is exposed. Brands in the middle of the pyramid selling seasonal product at prices that assume permanence; portfolios heavy in footwear; jewellery whose value rests on stones that can now be grown in a laboratory; and maisons dependent on tourist spending in the Gulf.
What could prove this wrong. Jewellery growth collapsing while gold stays high would mean the category was riding a fashion cycle, not a structural preference. A strong rebound in Gucci traffic after the cuts would suggest that price, not permanence, was the main problem. A fashion recovery led by novelty, for example from the new creative directors debuting in 2027, would weaken the permanence argument. And a sharp fall in resale values for jewellery icons would show that the floor is weaker than it looks.
What to watch over the next 12 to 24 months. The World Gold Council's jewellery tonnage and value each quarter; Richemont's full-year results in May; the gap between LVMH's watches and jewellery and its fashion and leather goods; Gucci's traffic and pricing after the cuts; resale prices for jewellery icons alongside the watch indices; and Bain's 2027 updates on buyer numbers, after a forecast of 0 to 4% growth for personal luxury goods next year.
THE WESHMIND VERDICT
The most important divide in luxury might not be between jewellery and fashion. It might be between prices the customer can explain and prices the customer is asked to take on faith. The evidence supports the direction of that shift more than its size. Jewellery and fashion both raised prices after 2019. Jewellery had a visible reason, a metal whose price rose by almost a quarter in a year, and objects worn for decades; it kept its customers and is growing 8 to 10%. Fashion had only the brand's word, and objects that date within a season; it is now cutting prices and hiring pricing directors. Hermès shows that fashion can sit on the right side of this line, and lab-grown diamonds show that jewellery can sit on the wrong one. The houses that read 2026 as a category story will move budgets from bags to bracelets. The ones that read it correctly will ask a harder question of every product they sell: will the customer still be able to justify this price in five years?






